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The Effects of Self-Managed and Closely-Managed Teams 
on Labor Productivity and Product Quality: An Empirical 
Analysis of a Cross Section of Establishments 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
I estimate the effect of team production on labor productivity and product quality using a cross 
section of British establishments, finding that the typical establishment enjoys statistically 
significant increases in labor productivity (but not product quality) from using teams, though 
there is no statistically significant difference between the predicted gains from autonomous 
versus non-autonomous teams.  I show that standard methodological approaches that treat teams 
and autonomy as exogenous induce biases of two forms: 1) the benefits from teams are inflated, 
2) the benefits of autonomous teams relative to those of non-autonomous teams are inflated.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper contributes to a vast and growing literature concerning the effects of team 
production on organizational performance.  Using the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS), a large and nationally-representative cross section of British establishments, I 
estimate the effects of team production on labor productivity and product quality and ask 
whether and how these effects differ when teams are granted autonomy.  Table 1 summarizes the 
previous literature on the effects of team production on workplace outcomes.  Some studies are 
single-firm cases that exploit temporal variation in human resource practices (such as a switch 
from individual production to team production).  Others are cross sectional, exploiting variation 
in the use and nature of teams across individual firms or production units.  Others use panel data 
spanning many organizations to exploit both types of variation, though there tends to be less 
variation temporally than across production units.  Studies also differ widely in their choice of 
dependent variable (e.g. labor productivity, product quality, financial performance, turnover, 
wages, absenteeism, innovation and R&D, worker well-being and satisfaction, layoff rates) and 
in whether the focus is on team production alone or on an entire system of human resources 
practices of which team production is one component.  Frequently these studies concern “self-
managed” teams in which team members enjoy significant autonomy concerning how the work 
is executed, in contrast to closely-managed teams in which supervisors exercise considerable 
control over tasks.  The emphasis on self-managed teams arises from theoretical considerations 
suggesting that the benefits of team production to organizational performance are contingent on 
teams being conferred with sufficient autonomy over their work.   
While the studies in Table 1 differ in analysis samples, dependent variables, types of 
teams analyzed, and whether teams are analyzed alone or as part of a broader system, they are 
united by their common methodological approach of treating both team production and the 
degree of autonomy granted to team members as exogenous in models of organizational 
performance.1  In contrast, the distinguishing feature of the present study is that I treat both of 
these variables as endogenous.  The reason is that the existence of team production and the 
degree to which teams are conferred with authority over the execution of tasks are not 
exogenously assigned to firms in a random fashion.  Rather, they are the result of employer 
decisions that are presumably made in an effort to improve organizational performance.  This is 
important, because unmeasured determinants of an employer’s choices of teams and autonomy 
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(such as, for example, managerial personality and tastes, and the social atmosphere of the 
workplace) are likely correlated with unmeasured determinants of organizational performance.  It 
might also be that good workers go to work in more productive establishments and that 
establishments with good workers choose team production.  Correlations in the unobserved 
determinants of managerial choices and organizational performance result in biased estimates of 
the effects of interest if the endogeneity of teams and autonomy is ignored.   
An advantage of the WERS is that it has variation not only in whether or not team 
production is used but in the type of team production used, in particular whether or not team 
members are granted autonomy.  It also includes information on labor productivity and product 
quality.  While panel data would be preferable to cross sectional data for the purpose of 
measuring the effects of teams on organizational outcomes, I do not know of any nationally-
representative panel datasets that are appropriate and large enough for this analysis.  My research 
strategy is therefore to exploit the unique and extensive information contained in the available 
cross sectional data, while simultaneously addressing the concerns arising from correlations in 
unobserved determinants of employer choices and organizational outcomes.        
 The focus on labor productivity and product quality in this paper is consistent with the 
main emphasis of the economics literature on the productivity effects of teams.  Labor 
productivity is the most commonly-studied outcome measure in such studies (e.g. Hamilton, 
Nickerson, and Owan 2003, Eriksson 2003, Kato and Morishima 2002, Black and Lynch 2001, 
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997, Banker, Field, Schroeder, and Sinha 1996, Ichniowski 
1990).  Often the studies in this literature consider product quality as a second outcome variable 
of interest (e.g. Ichniowski and Shaw 1999, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997, Banker, 
Field, Schroeder, and Sinha 1996).  The focus on labor productivity and product quality is driven 
by clear theoretical channels of influence predicting effects of teams on these outcomes, as 
discussed in the next section.  The new contribution of the present study is to investigate the 
implications of endogeneity of teams and autonomy in the labor productivity (and to a lesser 
extent product quality) models that have been the central focus of economic studies of team 
production.2   
The previous study that is nearest to the present analysis is DeVaro (2006), which 
considered financial performance as an outcome variable.  That study also allowed for the 
endogeneity of teams and autonomy, finding a positive effect of teams for the typical workplace 
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and no statistically significant difference between autonomous and non-autonomous teams in 
terms of their predicted benefits to financial performance.  However, biases from ignoring the 
endogeneity of teams and autonomy were found to be relatively modest.  In the present paper I 
apply the structural model that was developed in DeVaro (2006) to the study of labor 
productivity and product quality.   
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
All relevant aspects of the quality of a product or service would, in principle, be 
subsumed in a comprehensive definition of labor productivity.  That is, the labor productivity 
measures would be fully “quality adjusted.”  If labor productivity measures are comprehensive, 
then an improvement in product quality that enhances the value (and thus price) of a product or 
service should also contribute to higher productivity.  It then follows that an empirical result that 
teams improve productivity but not quality would shed light on the mechanism by which 
productivity enhancements are secured.  Throughout the paper, however, I avoid drawing such 
inferences from comparisons between labor productivity results and quality results.  While the 
two concepts are conceptually related, it is unclear whether the respondents report answers to the 
labor productivity question that fully account for quality, and this assumption is crucial to 
interpretations of the type just described.3       
Some of the main benefits of team production accrue through productive information 
sharing among workers, when potential team members have knowledge that is non-duplicative 
and also relevant to the production process (Lazear 1995, 1998).  These synergies in information 
can give rise to new ideas about process improvement that lead to higher product quality.4  The 
potential for such productive synergies should theoretically increase with the size of the group 
and the associated pool of ideas, though some costs also increase with group size including the 
greater likelihood of free riding.5  Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that teams alleviate costly 
monitoring of workers in the presence of asymmetric information by relying on monitoring of 
workers through peer pressure.  Mohrman and Novelli (1985) discuss two ways in which teams 
produce benefits to labor productivity and product quality.  The first is that teams lead to idea 
generation and implementation, which in turn leads to improved productivity and quality.  The 
second is that teams lead to improved job satisfaction, motivation, and task performance, which 
ultimately translates into increased productivity.  A variety of costs are also associated with team 
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production.  These include regular team meetings and training, and shirking and free-riding 
among team members (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982, Rasmusen 1987, Itoh 
1991, 1992, McAfee and McMillan 1991, Legros and Matthews 1993).   
It is frequently argued that teams confer the greatest benefits when they are granted 
autonomy, and indeed autonomous or self-managing teams have been the focus of much of the 
empirical teams literature.  The distinguishing feature of self-managed or autonomous teams is 
that team members are given the latitude to jointly decide how their work is to be done.   The 
alternative to an autonomous team is a non-autonomous or closely-managed team, in which team 
members have little discretion over tasks and are told not only what to do but how to do it.  
When the teams under study are autonomous or self-managing, a positive effect on firm 
performance is typically found in the literature.  For example, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 
(2003) found a fourteen percent increase in labor productivity after the introduction of self-
managed teams in a garment manufacturing plant, and Eriksson (2003) found a positive effect of 
self-managed teams on labor productivity in a cross section of establishments.   
Theoretical rationales for granting teams autonomy can be found both in economics and 
in organizational behavior.  In economics the relevant literature concerns the delegation of 
authority within organizations, and the insights from this literature are relevant in the team 
context even though the theories are frequently framed in language pertaining to individual 
workers.6  Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995) suggested that 
authority may be conferred by the ownership of an asset, which gives the owner the right to 
make decisions concerning the use of this asset.  More generally, authority may result from an 
explicit or implicit contract allocating decision rights to a team or to an individual worker in the 
organization.  An idea that emerges from this literature is that the agent’s incentives are weaker 
when he does not have control over asset-allocation decisions.  In the team context, this suggests 
a benefit from granting autonomy.  An important contribution to this incentives-based literature 
is Aghion and Tirole (1997), which develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the 
formal right to decide) and real authority (the effective or de facto control over actual decision 
making) within organizations.   
Asymmetric information is key to the Aghion and Tirole model.  A principal who has 
formal authority over a decision or activity can always reverse the subordinate’s decision but will 
refrain from doing so if the subordinate is much better informed and if their objectives are 
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reasonably congruent.  In the Aghion and Tirole model, there are two main benefits associated 
with delegating formal authority to the agent (or team in the present context).  First, it credibly 
increases the agent’s initiative or incentive to acquire information, since the granting of authority 
prevents the principal from over-ruling the agent in those situations in which both parties have 
acquired the information.  Second, granting authority over decisions that matter relatively more 
to the agent than to the principal (an example would be performing the job standing up versus 
sitting down) and for which the principal’s overruling might hurt the agent will make the agent 
more likely to participate in the contractual relationship.  The main cost of delegating authority is 
the principal’s loss of control over the choice of tasks or projects and how they are executed.  An 
increase in an agent’s real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the 
principal.  This basic tradeoff between loss of control and initiative is a central idea, and in the 
team context it implies that granting teams more autonomy is not necessarily better.   
In organizational behavior, the rationale for granting autonomy evolved from work on 
motivational job design for individual workers (Hackman and Oldham 1976, 1980; Turner and 
Lawrence 1965).7  According to the theory, the degree of autonomy a worker is granted affects 
three critical psychological states (experienced meaningfulness, experienced responsibility, and 
knowledge of results), which in turn induces a number of outcomes of interest both to workers 
and firms, such as high internal work motivation, high quality work performance, high 
satisfaction with work, and low absenteeism and turnover.  Hackman (1987) applied these ideas 
to teams, synthesizing an extensive literature on group research to propose variables that are key 
to group job design.  Hackman identified a number of task conditions that would produce high 
task motivation, and among these was autonomy.  That is, the tasks assigned to the group should 
provide group members with substantial autonomy for deciding how best to accomplish them. 
To the extent that workers experience autonomy in a team production context, Hackman 
(1987) argues that they experience greater motivation, which should translate into higher labor 
productivity.  There is also evidence that in some production contexts monitoring by peers in 
self-managed teams is better than supervisory monitoring, encouraging team members to meet 
self-imposed group norms (Barker 1993).  As mentioned earlier, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue 
that teams alleviate costly monitoring of workers in the presence of asymmetric information by 
relying on monitoring of workers through peer pressure.  A theoretical counterargument is the 
agency perspective (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982) that predicts shirking and 
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free-riding problems to increase in a team context when workers are no longer closely monitored 
by supervisors.8  Self-managed teams change the organizational structure of firms, from 
hierarchical to horizontal, as team members assume some of the discretion that would otherwise 
be held by management.  This is another means by which team production can impact labor 
productivity.  See Batt (2001) for further discussion.     
 
III. DATA AND MEASURES 
The data are from the management questionnaire in the 1998 Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS), jointly sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry, ACAS, 
the Economic and Social Research Council, and the Policy Studies Institute.9  Distributed via the 
UK Data Archive, the WERS data are a nationally representative stratified random sample 
covering British workplaces with at least ten employees except for those in the following 1992 
Standard Industrial Classification divisions: agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining 
and quarrying; private households with employed persons; and extra-territorial organizations.  
Some of the 3192 workplaces targeted were found to be out of scope, and the final sample size of 
2191 implies a net response rate of 80.4% (Cully et al., 1999) after excluding the out-of-scope 
cases.  Data were collected between October 1997 and June 1998 via face-to-face interviews, and 
the respondent manager was usually the most senior manager at the workplace with 
responsibility for employment relations.   
 
Labor Productivity and Product Quality 
Each respondent manager in the WERS is asked how the current labor productivity of the 
workplace compares with that of other establishments in the same industry.  The analogous 
question is then asked for the establishment’s current quality of product or service compared 
with that of other establishments in the industry.  Responses to both questions are: “A lot better 
than average”, “Better than average”, “About average for industry”, “Below average”, “A lot 
below average”, and “No comparison possible.”   
Since the survey is anonymous, there are no incentives for respondents to purposefully 
misrepresent their answers to either question.  Nonetheless, since the measures are subjective 
responses they are potentially affected by reporting errors.10  Unsystematic reporting errors add 
noise to the observed measures, biasing the treatment effects of interest towards zero.  Such 
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errors might result from imperfect information on the part of respondents, though it is hoped that 
the most senior manager at the establishment would usually be knowledgeable about the industry 
and have a good sense of how the establishment’s productivity and product quality stand relative 
to that of the competition.  Systematic reporting errors might arise from the “Lake Wobegon 
effect” whereby most respondents claim to have above-average performance.11  Even if all 
respondents overstate productivity, this need not amount to anything more than a relabeling of 
the discrete categories describing productivity, with no implications for the treatment effects of 
interest as long as the systematic reporting error is uncorrelated with the treatment.  Furthermore, 
the mere observation of a heavy concentration of responses on the high end of the scale is not 
necessarily evidence of reporting errors of the Lake Wobegon type but could instead be the result 
of length-biased sampling.  The survey conditions on establishments being operational when 
sampled; the more successful establishments experience longer durations of operation and are 
therefore more likely than unsuccessful establishments to be sampled at a point in time.12   
Systematic reporting errors could potentially be correlated with teams and autonomy.  
This could arise if an omitted variable, such as “managerial optimism,” determines both the 
outcome measure (labor productivity or product quality) and the decision to engage in teams.  It 
might be that the more optimistic managers have a rosier view of the establishment’s 
performance relative to the industry average and that such managers are more likely to organize 
production in teams.  Such reporting errors would bias estimates of the teams treatment in a 
regression of organizational performance on the use of teams.  But my estimation approach 
explicitly accounts for correlations in the unobserved determinants of teams, autonomy, and 
organizational performance, so that these correlations are not confounded with the treatment 
effects of interest.  It is precisely concerns such as these (namely omitted unobserved variables 
that might influence not only the employer’s response to questions about organizational 
performance but also the issues of whether teams are chosen and granted autonomy) that 
motivate the structural approach taken in this paper.13 
 
Teams and Autonomy 
 Respondent managers are asked to report the proportion of employees in the largest 
occupational group at the workplace that works in formally designated teams:  “All 100%”, 
“Almost all 80-99%”, “Most 60-79%”, “Around half 40-59%”, “Some 20-39%”, “Just a few 1- 
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19%”, or “None 0%”.  An advantage of this question is that it specifically refers to “formally 
designated” teams, directing the respondent’s attention to situations of true joint production and 
reducing the respondent’s likelihood of reporting the use of teams simply on the basis of a 
cooperative atmosphere of “team spirit” at the workplace.  The restriction to the establishment’s 
largest occupational group is one limitation of the data.  The sample may contain establishments 
in which team production is heavily used in occupational groups other than the largest, yet the 
response to this question might be “None 0%”.   
The survey also contains a measure of team autonomy that closely corresponds to the 
notion of autonomy discussed in the economics literature on organizations and in the literature 
on organizational behavior (Aghion and Tirole 1997, Hackman 1987).  Hackman (1987) writes 
that team members are motivated when “the task provides group members with substantial 
autonomy for deciding about how they do the work [emphasis added] – in effect, the group 
‘owns’ the task and is responsible for the work outcomes.”  For establishments that report the use 
of formally designated teams in the largest occupational group, the respondent is asked to 
respond “Yes” or “No” to the following statement:  “Team members jointly decide how the work 
is to be done.”  The distinguishing feature of an autonomous or self-managing team is that team 
members are granted discretion over how their work is to be done.14  In contrast, closely-
managed or non-autonomous teams are given a task and told not only what to do but how to do 
it.   
There are 2182 non-missing observations for teams, 1774 for labor productivity, 1972 for 
product quality, 1769 for labor productivity and teams simultaneously, and 1966 for product 
quality and teams simultaneously.  The tendency to use teams is similar whether or not labor 
productivity (product quality) is observed; the fraction using teams in the largest occupational 
group is 0.876 (0.871) when productivity (product quality) is non-missing and 0.843 (0.856) 
when it is missing.  Appendix A presents descriptive information on the unconditional 
associations between teams and organizational performance. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Since the models estimated here have the same structure as the model for financial 
performance proposed and estimated in DeVaro (2006), the description here is brief (see 
Appendix B for technical details).  The endogenous variables are defined as follows: 
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LABPRODi = 1 if labor productivity is “About average for industry” or below 
         = 2 if labor productivity is “Better than average” 
        = 3 if labor productivity is “A lot better than average” 
QUALITYi = 1 if quality of product or service is “About average for industry” or below 
        = 2 if quality of product or service is “Better than average” 
       = 3 if quality of product or service is “A lot better than average”  
TEAMSi = 1 if positive fraction of workers in the largest occupational group is in teams 
    = 0 otherwise 
AUTOi = 1 if team members are allowed to jointly decide how the work is to be done 
             = 0 otherwise 
The labor productivity and product quality measures aggregate 5 discrete categories to 3, and the 
teams measure aggregates 7 discrete categories to 2, to facilitate estimation of the structural 
models by reducing the number of discrete states.  
 The structural model for labor productivity (product quality) simultaneously estimates 
four equations: one for labor productivity (product quality) given that teams are used in the 
largest occupational group, a second for labor productivity (product quality) given that teams are 
not used in the largest occupational group, a third for teams, and a fourth for autonomy. I assume 
the four disturbance terms in each model follow the multivariate normal distribution, estimating 
the models by maximum likelihood. The exogenous variables included in each equation are 
defined in Table 2. 
An indicator variable for “just-in-time” production appears in the teams equation but not 
the equations for labor productivity and product quality. Just-in-time is frequently cited as an 
important determinant of the decision to use team production. As argued by Berg et al. (1996) in 
the context of the apparel industry, the demands of just-in-time production require flexible 
organizational structures such as teams.15  More recently, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 
(2003) cite the demand by retailers for just-in-time production as a major reason for the 
introduction of teams during 1995-1997 in the garment manufacturing establishment they study. 
The assumption that just-in-time has no direct effect on either (within-industry) labor 
productivity or product quality is rather strong, though it should be noted that whether or not a 
production process is characterized by just-in-time is more central to discussions of teams in the 
literature than it is to discussions of labor productivity and product quality. Empirical studies of 
labor productivity or product quality rarely include just-in-time production as a determinant of 
labor productivity or product quality, nor do they discuss the implications of omitting it. Finally, 
my work with these data confirms that there is no noteworthy statistical relationship between 
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just-in-time and either labor productivity or product quality, either unconditionally or in the 
presence of controls.16  
Four variables that proxy for the organizational and informational structure of the 
establishment, the alignment of incentives between workers and owners, and the importance to 
the establishment of monitoring inputs appear only in the autonomy equation. The first three of 
these are qualitative measures of managerial opinion. The manager is asked to respond “Strongly 
agree” (1), “Agree” (2), “Neither agree nor disagree” (3), “Disagree” (4), or “Strongly disagree” 
(5) to each of the following statements: 
Information:  “Those at the top are best placed to make decisions about this workplace.” 
Incentive Alignment:  “Employees here are fully committed to the values of this 
organization.” 
Decisions:  “Most decisions at this workplace are made without consulting employees.” 
The fourth, pertaining to the importance to the organization of closely monitoring labor inputs, is 
the proportion of workers at the establishment that ever work from home during normal working 
hours.17  Responses include: “Half or more 50%+” (1), “A quarter up to a half 25-49%” (2), “Up 
to a quarter 10-24%” (3), “A small proportion 5-9%” (4), “Hardly any (less than 5%)” (5), or 
“None 0%” (6).   
In establishments where top managers have better information for making decisions than 
workers on the line, autonomy is less likely to be granted to teams. Therefore, “Information” and 
“Decisions” should both have positive effects, meaning that employers who disagree with those 
statements are more likely to grant autonomy. In establishments where the interests and goals of 
workers are aligned with those of the firm, autonomy is more likely to be granted to teams.18  
Therefore “Incentive Alignment” should have a negative sign, since agreement with the 
statement is associated with more autonomy (Aghion and Tirole 1997). The fraction of 
employees who work at home might be thought of as a proxy for the importance the employer 
places on monitoring workers through direct supervision, as opposed to relying on the social 
norms and peer pressure that arise in a team context, as discussed in Kandel and Lazear (1992).  
Therefore, the expected sign on this variable is negative, meaning that workplaces that are more 
permissive of working from home are more likely to grant team autonomy.19  
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V. RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 display the parameter estimates.20,21 The following functions of these 
parameters give the effect of team production overall (whether autonomous or non-autonomous) 
on labor productivity and product quality for establishment i: 
(Effect A1)i = Prob(LABPRODi = 1 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(LABPRODi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A2)i = Prob(LABPRODi = 2 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(LABPRODi = 2 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A3)i = Prob(LABPRODi = 3 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(LABPRODi = 3 | TEAMSi = 0) 
 
(Effect A1Q)i = Prob(QUALITYi = 1 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(QUALITYi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A2Q)i = Prob(QUALITYi = 2 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(QUALITYi = 2 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A3Q)i = Prob(QUALITYi = 3 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(QUALITYi = 3 | TEAMSi = 0) 
 
Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 1 convey this information graphically. Establishments predicted to 
benefit the most from team production are those farthest from the origin in the second quadrant, 
and those predicted to be hurt the most are those farthest from the origin in the fourth quadrant.   
In both the labor productivity and product quality plots, the predicted effect of team production is 
positive for many establishments and negative for many others, though the positive effects 
appear to dominate.   
For the labor productivity model, I rank the establishments in order by their values of 
(Effect A3 – Effect A1), which is a measure of the predicted effect of teams on productivity.  I 
then select three establishments of interest (the median establishment, the establishment at the 
25th percentile, and the establishment at the 75th percentile), determining whether their respective 
values of Effects A1, A2, and A3 are statistically significantly different from zero.  I follow the 
analogous approach for the product quality model, ranking firms by their values of (Effect A3Q 
– Effect A1Q) and selecting three new establishments of interest.  For these six establishments, I 
also compute: 1) the effect of autonomous teams on labor productivity (or product quality), 2) 
the effect of non-autonomous teams on labor productivity (or product quality), 3) the incremental 
effect of autonomy on labor productivity (or product quality) given that teams are used.22       
Tables 5 and 6 display the main results.23  The first main result is that the median 
workplace benefits considerably from team production in terms of labor productivity but not in 
terms of product quality.  The effect of team production is an 11.0 percentage point decrease in 
the probability that labor productivity is at or below the industry average.  The point estimates 
suggest that of these 11.0 percentage points, 8.0 are accounted for by an increase in the 
probability that labor productivity is better than the industry average and the remaining 3.0 are 
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accounted for by an increase in the probability that labor productivity is “a lot above average” for 
the industry.  Although the point estimates reveal a positive effect of team production on product 
quality for the median workplace, this result is statistically insignificant.   
 The second main result is that there is no important difference between the effects of 
autonomous teams and those of non-autonomous teams.  As was the case for team production in 
general, for both autonomous and non-autonomous team production the median workplace 
benefits considerably in terms of labor productivity.  While the point estimates suggest slightly 
higher benefits from autonomous teams than from non-autonomous teams, the difference 
between the two types of teams is statistically insignificant.  For product quality, the only effect 
that achieves significance at the ten percent level is the effect of autonomous teams on the 
probability that product quality is “a lot above” the industry average.  As with labor productivity, 
the point estimates are slightly more favorable to autonomous than to non-autonomous teams, 
but again the difference between the two types of teams is statistically insignificant. The finding 
of no significant difference between autonomous and non-autonomous teams holds for the 
workplaces at the 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles as well as at the median.  At least in terms of statistical 
significance, the data therefore do not support the notion that self-managed or non-autonomous 
teams are superior to closely-managed or non-autonomous teams.  
 The third main finding is that, while the workplaces at the 0.75 quantile experience 
predicted benefits to both labor productivity and product quality that far exceed those at the 
median, there is no evidence that the workplaces at the 0.25 quantile suffer in either dimension 
from using teams.  For the workplace at the 0.75 quantile in the labor productivity model, using 
teams is associated with a decrease of 21.0 percentage points in the predicted probability that 
labor productivity is at or below the industry average and an 8.7 percentage point increase in the 
probability that productivity is “a lot above” the industry average, and these magnitudes are 
significantly higher than those for the median workplace.  For the workplace at the 0.75 quantile 
in the product quality model, using teams is associated with a decrease of 13.2 percentage points 
in the predicted probability that quality is at or below the industry average and an increase of 
11.4 percentage points in the probability that quality is “a lot above” the industry average.  The 
corresponding numbers for the median workplace were only 3.7 and 6.0 percentage points, 
respectively, and neither were statistically insignificant.  Turning to the workplaces at lower 
quantiles of the predicted benefits from using teams, for labor productivity none of the effects are 
 14 
statistically significant for the workplace at the 0.25 quantile and even the point estimates do not 
suggest a detriment to using teams. For product quality, while the point estimates for the 
workplace at the 0.25 quantile suggest a negative effect from using teams, the magnitudes are 
small and all effects are statistically insignificant.   
 The fourth set of findings concerns the correlations among the unobserved determinants 
of the endogenous variables.  Note that σ13, or cov(ε1, ε3), is the correlation between the 
unobserved determinants of autonomy (given that teams are used) and labor productivity 
(product quality) give that teams are used.24  It is negative and statistically significant in both 
models, implying that unobserved factors that make an establishment more likely to grant 
autonomy to teams also tend to depress labor productivity and product quality. An example of 
such a factor might be fun, likable, and laid back managers at the workplace. Such managers 
might be popular among workers, and more likely to grant considerable discretion to team 
members, but lax in enforcing high standards for labor productivity and product quality. Further 
note that σ23, or cov(ε2, ε3), is the correlation of the unobserved determinants of teams and 
autonomy (given that teams are used).  It is negative and statistically significant in both models, 
suggesting some unobserved characteristic of the production process (or of managers) that makes 
closely-managed teams attractive. Finally, note that σ02, or cov(ε0, ε2), is the correlation of the 
unobserved determinants of teams and labor productivity (product quality) given teams are not 
used. It is negative and statistically significant in the product quality model, suggesting that 
factors that make an establishment more likely to use teams are also likely to make that 
establishment have lower product quality in the absence of teams. One example of such a factor 
would be the degree to which product or service quality increases from the complementarities 
arising from information sharing among coworkers. When such benefits from information 
sharing are large, teams are more likely to be used, and product or service quality is more likely 
to suffer if teams are not used.   
 A frequent approach in management research is to treat the choice variables of the 
organization (such as team production and autonomy in this study) as exogenous on the right-
hand side of regressions of organizational outcomes.25  Ignoring the endogeneity of teams and 
autonomy means assuming that the disturbances are uncorrelated across equations. The last four 
rows of Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the data are incompatible with such restrictions for both 
labor productivity and product quality.26  If the restrictions are imposed anyway, a visual 
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summary of how the results change can be seen by comparing Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 1 to 
Panels 3 and 4.  In Panels 3 and 4 the predicted effects are more heavily concentrated in the 
second quadrant (where the predicted benefits from teams are the highest) and less concentrated 
in the fourth quadrant (where the predicted benefits are the lowest) than in the corresponding 
structural scatter plots in Panels 1 and 2. This shift in the scatter is clearly more pronounced for 
product quality than for labor productivity.  To reveal the magnitudes of these distortions, Tables 
7 and 8 display the key effects of interest based on the constrained models.  These tables are 
analogous to Tables 5 and 6, respectively, that were based on the structural models.  For labor 
productivity, as seen by comparing Tables 5 and 7, the Effects A1, A2, and A3 that were found 
to be (-0.110, 0.080, 0.030) for the median establishment using the structural model would be  
(-0.125, 0.086, 0.039) if the endogeneity of teams and autonomy were ignored.  In this case the 
magnitude of the distortion is relatively modest.   
The magnitude of the bias is much larger in the case of product quality and gives rise to a 
qualitatively different conclusion.  As was seen in Table 6, Effects A1Q, A2Q, and A3Q were  
(-0.037, -0.023, 0.060) for the median establishment using the structural product quality model, 
and each of these estimates were statistically insignificant.  In contrast, as revealed in Table 8, 
when endogeneity is ignored the corresponding numbers are (-0.068, -0.014, 0.082) and are 
statistically significant.  In summary, by treating teams and autonomy as exogenous in the 1998 
WERS, we would incorrectly infer an economically and statistically significant positive effect of 
teams on product quality for the median workplace, whereas accounting for the endogeneity we 
would infer no statistically significant effect.   
Ignoring the endogeneity of teams and autonomy in the 1998 WERS would also lead to 
mistaken inferences regarding the difference between autonomous and non-autonomous teams.  
As revealed in the fourth columns of Tables 5 and 6, the structural model implies that there are 
no statistically significant differences between autonomous and non-autonomous teams in their 
effects on either labor productivity or product quality.  In contrast, if the endogeneity of teams 
and autonomy is ignored, the fourth column of Table 8 would lead us to the erroneous 
conclusion that autonomous teams yield statistically significantly larger benefits to product 
quality than do non-autonomous teams, at each of the three quantiles of interest. For labor 
productivity, both the structural and non-structural models yield roughly the same qualitative 
conclusions regarding the difference between autonomous and non-autonomous teams. 
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 The finding that the endogeneity bias tends to inflate the relative benefits of autonomous 
teams as opposed to non-autonomous teams, at least in this data set with these measures of 
organizational performance, is interesting in light of the common view that autonomous teams 
tend to be superior to non-autonomous teams in terms of their benefits to organizational 
performance.  For example, one of the leading texts in strategic human resource management 
argues that “Closely managed teams miss many of the advantages that internally autonomous 
teams can have, while possessing a number of the disadvantages. Except where concerns for 
internal equity are paramount, allowing teams the freedom to internally manage themselves 
seems to us the better strategy.” (Baron and Kreps 1999). The results here suggest that neglecting 
the endogeneity of teams and autonomy might contribute to an overly sanguine view of the 
merits of autonomous teams relative to non-autonomous teams. While my best estimates suggest 
no differences between the two types of teams for any of the three measures of organizational 
performance, neglecting the endogeneity in the WERS data would lead one to the erroneous 
conclusion that the typical establishment benefits more (in terms of product quality) from 
autonomous than from non-autonomous teams.   
 Another point that emerges regarding the relative advantages of autonomous and non-
autonomous teams is that whether autonomous teams are preferable to non-autonomous teams 
for the typical workplace depends on the measure of organizational performance considered.  In 
the present study of labor productivity and product quality, the point estimates favored 
autonomous teams. In an earlier analysis of financial performance in DeVaro (2006), the reverse 
was true. In the empirical teams literature, the most commonly used measures of performance are 
labor productivity and product quality, whereas broader measures of organizational performance 
such as profit are much rarer. The results of this study suggest that a second possible reason 
(apart from the endogeneity issue) for the relatively favorable view of autonomous teams is the 
heavy focus in the literature on outcome measures such as labor productivity.  If the focus of 
future work shifts more in the direction of broader measures of organizational performance, then 
the results from the WERS suggest that the evidence in favor of non-autonomous or closely-
managed teams may improve.  Increased attention to broader outcome measures such as financial 
performance would be desirable in any case. Such measures are more inclusive of the full 
spectrum of benefits and costs resulting from teams than are intermediate outcomes such as labor 
productivity.  Most firms will ultimately care the most about what effect a given human resource 
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practice has on profit, regardless of how various intermediates such as labor productivity and 
product quality may be affected.  In summary, the work here suggests that greater attention both 
to endogeneity and to broader measures of organizational performance in future research is likely 
to yield results that are more favorable to non-autonomous teams than have been found in 
previous work.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1 displays the distribution of labor productivity categories by the percentage of 
workers in teams.  A chi-square test of independence has a p-value of 0.005, providing strong 
evidence against the null that the team production and labor productivity classifications are 
independent of each other.  Restricting our attention to those establishments that use teams and 
that grant teams autonomy by allowing team members to jointly decide how the work is to be 
done, column percentages are given in Table A2.  The chi-square test of independence has a p-
value of 0.271, so the null that the autonomous teams and labor productivity classifications are 
independent cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels.  Tables A3 and A4 display 
the results for product quality, and the p-values from chi-square tests of independence are 0.820 
and 0.880, respectively.  In summary, the descriptive evidence suggests that team production is 
empirically related to labor productivity but that, given that teams are used, self-managed or 
autonomous team production is not. In contrast, neither team production in general nor 
autonomous team production is empirically related to product quality. However, these 
tabulations are unconditional. 
 
TABLE A1:  Labor Productivity by % of Largest Occupational Group in Teams 
 0% 1-19% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-99% 100% 
Distribution of Labor Productivity (unweighted) 
A lot below average 0.9 1.1 1.4 2.3 1.0 0.0 0.2 
Below average 3.7 3.2 7.8 6.7 6.1 5.6 3.6 
About average for industry 50.9 48.9 35.5 51.7 43.2 43.9 40.0 
Better than average 34.3 36.2 46.8 32.6 42.1 40.0 40.9 
A lot better than average 10.2 10.6 8.5 6.7 7.6 10.8 15.4 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Distribution of Labor Productivity (weighted) 
A lot below average 0.4 0.6 2.8 0.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 
Below average 1.0 2.4 8.5 3.5 9.4 2.5 3.8 
About average for industry 51.2 64.8 26.8 61.6 36.8 45.9 37.2 
Better than average 38.0 26.3 39.0 29.0 44.1 40.1 43.2 
A lot better than average 9.5 5.9 23.0 5.0 8.1 11.5 15.7 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note:  Column categories represent the fraction of the largest occupational group that is engaged in team 
production.  Row categories represent the labor productivity of the establishment relative to the industry 
average, as reported by the respondent manager.  Sample size is 1727. 
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TABLE A2:  Labor Productivity by % of Largest Occupational Group in Autonomous Teams 
 1-19% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-99% 100% 
Distribution of Labor Productivity, Given Autonomous Teams (unweighted) 
A lot below average 2.2 1.6 2.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 
Below average 4.4 6.3 4.7 6.5 4.7 3.8 
About average for industry 47.8 35.9 46.5 43.0 39.8 38.8 
Better than average 34.8 50.0 37.2 39.3 44.5 42.6 
A lot better than average 10.9 6.3 9.3 9.4 11.0 14.8 
                        Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Distribution of Labor Productivity, Given Autonomous Teams (weighted) 
A lot below average 1.1 6.6 0.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Below average 1.5 4.8 3.0 12.2 1.4 4.7 
About average for industry 65.2 19.3 53.8 34.3 38.1 34.0 
Better than average 26.2 50.0 35.7 40.7 51.5 44.8 
A lot better than average 5.9 19.3 7.3 10.2 9.0 16.4 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note:  Column categories represent the fraction of the largest occupational group that is engaged in  
team production, given that teams are used and granted autonomy.  Row categories represent the labor 
productivity of the establishment relative to the industry average, as reported by the respondent manager.   
Sample size is 843. 
 
 
TABLE A3:  Product Quality by % of Largest Occupational Group in Teams 
 0% 1-19% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-99% 100% 
Distribution of Product Quality (unweighted) 
A lot below average 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Below average 3.2 2.0 2.7 1.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 
About average for industry 26.5 24.2 29.5 24.7 25.2 25.6 23.7 
Better than average 51.8 54.6 46.6 51.7 51.9 52.6 48.9 
A lot better than average 18.5 19.2 21.2 21.4 20.6 19.5 24.8 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Distribution of Product Quality (weighted) 
A lot below average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Below average 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.5 5.6 0.9 2.7 
About average for industry 21.0 12.0 35.1 21.0 23.7 25.8 18.8 
Better than average 52.7 66.4 44.5 50.8 50.5 53.2 49.2 
A lot better than average 25.3 20.2 18.7 26.0 20.1 20.1 29.3 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note:  Column categories represent the fraction of the largest occupational group that is engaged in team 
production.  Row categories represent the product quality of the establishment relative to the industry 
average, as reported by the respondent manager.  Sample size is 1917. 
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TABLE A4:  Product Quality by % of Largest Occupational Group in Autonomous Teams 
 1-19% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-99% 100% 
Distribution of Product Quality, Given Autonomous Teams (unweighted) 
A lot below average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Below average 2.0 3.0 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 
About average for industry 24.0 31.8 16.7 28.6 26.1 22.3 
Better than average 60.0 45.5 59.5 50.4 50.0 50.0 
A lot better than average 14.0 19.7 21.4 19.3 22.1 25.7 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Distribution of Product Quality, Given Autonomous Teams (weighted) 
A lot below average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Below average 1.1 3.3 2.3 7.8 0.7 1.6 
About average for industry 8.7 41.7 16.5 31.7 27.6 16.2 
Better than average 73.3 38.2 60.2 43.2 50.4 48.5 
A lot better than average 16.9 16.8 21.1 17.3 21.4 33.7 
Column sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note:  Column categories represent the fraction of the largest occupational group that is engaged  
in team production, given that teams are used and granted autonomy.  Row categories represent  
the product quality of the establishment relative to the industry average, as reported by the  
respondent manager.  Sample size is 942. 
 
 
 In addition to establishment characteristics, the exogenous variables in the teams and 
autonomy equations of the structural models include industry controls since the establishment’s 
choices of teams and autonomy are also likely to vary by industry. I exclude these industry 
controls from the labor productivity and product quality equations since the survey asks the 
employer to rate the establishment’s current labor productivity and product quality compared 
with other establishments in the same industry, so industry differences are in effect already 
controlled by the nature of the question.27  The 12 industry controls are dummy variables 
indicating the 1992 SIC code that most closely corresponds to the main activity of the 
establishment.  The upper panel of Table A5 displays the distribution of the sample by industry. 
Since both the teams and autonomy variables measure organizational choices in the largest 
occupational group, I also include as exogenous variables in these equations a set of occupational 
dummy variables indicating the establishment’s largest occupational group. All survey responses 
correspond to SOC codes, some at the 1-digit level and others at the 2-digit level. I aggregated 
all observations to the 1-digit level, and sample frequencies for the resulting 9 occupational 
groups are displayed in the lower panel of Table A5.  Table A6 displays means and standard 
deviations for all variables in the structural models except for the occupation and industry 
variables that were summarized in Table A5.   
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TABLE A5:  Distribution of Establishments by Industry and Largest Occupational Group 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Distribution by Industry   
Manufacturing 253 14.7 276 14.4 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 68 3.9 69 3.6 
Construction 95 5.5 102 5.3 
Wholesale and Retail 267 15.5 292 15.2 
Hotels and Restaurants 114 6.6 122 6.4 
Transport and Communication 113 6.5 122 6.4 
Financial Services 86 5.0 95 5.0 
Other Business Services 178 10.3 197 10.3 
Public Administration 108 6.3 120 6.3 
Education 178 10.3 215 11.2 
Health 178 10.3 210 11.0 
Other Community Services 89 5.2 97 5.1 
         Total 1727 100 1917 100 
Distribution by Largest Occupational Group   
Managers & Administrators 10 0.6 13 0.7 
Professional Occupations 210 12.2 258 13.5 
Associate Professional & Technical Occupations 140 8.1 151 7.9 
Clerical & Secretarial Occupations 295 17.1 321 16.7 
Craft & Related Occupations 203 11.8 212 11.1 
Personal & Protective Service Occupations 231 13.4 272 14.2 
Sales Occupations 202 11.7 225 11.7 
Plant & Machine Operatives 235 13.6 252 13.2 
Other Occupations 201 11.6 213 11.1 
         Total 1727 100 1917 100 
Note:  Columns 1 and 2 use the subsample on which the labor productivity model is estimated, and columns 3 and 4 
use the subsample on which the product quality model is estimated. 
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TABLE A6:  Descriptive Statistics for Variables in 
         Structural Teams Models 
 Mean Standard  Deviation Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Dependent Variables   
Labor Productivity 1.632 0.683 1.630 0.684 
Product Quality 1.946 0.699 1.940 0.700 
Teams 0.875 0.331 0.870 0.336 
Autonomy 0.558 0.497 0.565 0.496 
Firm Controls   
Single-Establishment Firm 0.219 0.414 0.223 0.417 
Establishment Size 302.1 934.4 294.4 896.7 
Fraction of Part-Time Workers 0.263 0.285 0.264 0.283 
Temporary Workers 0.379 0.485 0.376 0.484 
Fixed-Term Workers Under 1 Year 0.429 0.495 0.432 0.495 
Fixed-Term Workers Over 1 Year 0.232 0.422 0.235 0.424 
Union Workers 0.647 0.478 0.646 0.478 
Private Sector Franchise 0.014 0.117 0.013 0.111 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.404 0.491 0.389 0.488 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise 0.013 0.115 0.012 0.109 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise 0.302 0.459 0.309 0.462 
Public Sector 0.271 0.445 0.281 0.450 
Just-in-time 0.318 0.466 0.307 0.461 
Information 2.733 1.085 2.734 1.090 
Incentive Alignment 2.311 0.846 2.298 0.845 
Decisions 3.737 0.987 3.740 0.988 
Work at Home 5.377 0.931 5.380 0.933 
    Sample Size  1727  1917  
Note: Columns 1 and 2 use the subsample on which the labor productivity model is estimated, and  
columns 3 and 4 use the subsample on which the product quality model is estimated.  The structural 
models also include indicators for industry and largest occupational group, and Table A5 reports the  
distributions of these variables.  See Table 2 for definitions of the variables. 
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APPENDIX B 
The models have the same structure as the model estimated in DeVaro (2006), and that 
earlier paper contains more details on the methodology.  Let i index establishments.  Let 
TEAMSi*, AUTOi*, and LABPRODi* denote latent indexes for teams, autonomy (given that 
teams are chosen), and labor productivity.  Let X1i, X2i, and X3i denote vectors of (exogenous) 
firm characteristics.  Assuming linear functional forms for the latent indexes, the structural 
model for labor productivity is as follows: 
 
LABPRODi* = αAUTOi + X1iδ1 + ε1i   if TEAMSi = 1 
           = X1iδ2 + ε0i      if TEAMSi = 0   
TEAMSi* = X2iβ + ε2i 
AUTOi* = X3iγ + ε3i     if TEAMSi = 1 
 
LABPRODi = 1 if LABPRODi* < 0 
         = 2 if 0 ≤ LABPRODi* < c 
         = 3 if LABPRODi* ≥ c  where c > 0 
TEAMSi = 1 if TEAMSi* > 0 
    = 0 otherwise 
AUTOi = 1 if AUTOi* > 0 and TEAMSi* > 0 
 = 0 if AUTOi* ≤ 0 and TEAMSi* > 0 
 
The model for product quality has the same structure.  The disturbances are assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution.  That is, (ε0, ε1, ε2, ε3) ~ MVN(0, Σ).  I impose some standard 
identifying restrictions on the covariance matrix (all diagonal elements are normalized to 1, and 
cov(ε0, ε1) = cov(ε0, ε3) = 0.  Since a small number of establishments have missing values for 
some of the exogenous variables, the estimation sample sizes are slightly smaller than those 
listed in the tabulations of the endogenous variables in Tables A1 – A4 of Appendix A.  I 
computed standard errors via the parametric bootstrap with 100 replications. The treatment 
effects of interest are as follows, where P1= Prob(LABPROD=1,TEAMS=1,AUTO=1), P2 = 
Prob(LABPROD=1,TEAMS=1,AUTO=0), P3 = Prob(LABPROD=2,TEAMS=1,AUTO=1), P4 = 
Prob(LABPROD=2,TEAMS=1,AUTO=0), P5 = Prob(LABPROD=3,TEAMS=1,AUTO=1), P6 = 
Prob(LABPROD=3,TEAMS=1,AUTO=0), P7 = Prob(LABPROD=1,TEAMS=0), P8 = 
Prob(LABPROD=2,TEAMS=0), and P9 = Prob(LABPROD=3,TEAMS=0):   
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NOTES 
 
1
 An exception is DeVaro (2006) which treats teams and autonomy as endogenous. 
2
 Other outcome measures, while not the focus of this study, are also important and worthy of study and have indeed 
been the focus of many studies, particularly outside of economics, as seen in Table 1.  Turnover, worker satisfaction, 
and absenteeism are examples of such alternative measures.   
3
 There is precedent in the literature for treating empirical measures of labor productivity and product quality as 
distinct concepts.  For example, in the analysis of the effects of HRM systems on labor productivity in the context of 
steel finishing lines, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) rely on a labor productivity measure that subsumes no 
notion of product quality.  The authors also report results from an independent and complementary analysis of 
product quality (measured as the grade of the finished product).  In their study, the empirical measures of labor 
productivity and product quality were clearly distinct and non-overlapping.  It is reasonable to expect that some of 
the WERS respondents would also have in mind distinct concepts of labor productivity and product quality when 
responding to the survey questions. 
4
 The idea that team production should yield benefits through the particular channel of product quality has also been 
discussed in the quality management literature, including Juran and Gryna (1980) which suggests the benefits of  
“breakthrough” teams and Deming (1986) which argues that quality improvement is realized through worker input  
and cooperation between workers and management. 
5
 Petersen (1992a) showed that group target-rate schemes, in which pay is high if a production target is reached and 
low otherwise, provide a potential solution to the free-rider problem.  Three alternative “non-market” solutions to 
the free-rider problem were proposed in Petersen (1992b), namely work-group-level social rewards, altruistic 
preferences, and moral commitment. 
6
 See DeVaro (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the theory of delegation of authority in organizations and the 
rationale for granting teams autonomy.  In addition, there is an industrial relations literature concerning the 
motivation of employers in instituting worker involvement.  While these decisions are driven in part by a desire to 
improve organizational performance, they also reflect idiosyncratic managerial motivations such as their own career 
advancement.  For a review of this literature see Bryson and Millward (1997). 
7
 See Griffin and McMahan (1994) for a review of this literature.  More recently, DeVaro, Li, and Brookshire (2006) 
review the empirical literature and test some propositions of the Job Characteristics Model using the 1998 WERS. 
8
 Petersen (1992a, 1992b) discusses alternative solutions to the free-rider problem 
9
 The 2004 WERS was released after this work was completed.  I chose not to switch to the 2004 dataset prior to 
publishing the paper, because I wanted to maintain comparability between the results in this paper and those in 
DeVaro (2006) and DeVaro and Kurtulus (2006), both of which use the 1998 WERS. 
10
 Of course, objective measures of organizational performance are also subject to reporting errors and often lead to 
higher rates of non-response, leading to suspicions of reporting bias.  Subjective measures may contain information 
to which the respondent is privy that would not be reflected in objective data such as accounting measures.  For an 
extended discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of subjective responses versus objective measures, see 
Kersley et al. (2006), the sourcebook for the 2004 WERS.   
11
 This effect was named in tribute to the mythical radio comedy community of Lake Wobegon.  Its origin appears 
to be the following statement:  “Welcome to Lake Wobegon, where all women are strong, all the men are good-
looking, and all the children are above average.”  – Garrison Keillor, A Prairie Home Companion 
 
12
 Furthermore, some time elapsed between sampling and field work, and this is relevant to the extent that low-
performing units were sampled but closed before field work occurred.  This cannot account for much of the heavy 
concentration of responses in the upper tail, however, since only 5 percent of sampled workplaces closed prior to 
field work. 
13
 Since the data are cross sectional, all that can be estimated is the correlation across unobservables at a point in 
time.  Nothing can be said about differences in the correlations between unobservables over time.   
14
 While the definition of autonomy I use corresponds most closely to the notion discussed in the literature, the 
WERS contains 3 measures that capture different dimensions of autonomy or the degree to which tasks are 
interrelated.  Given that teams are reported to be used in the largest occupational group, the respondent is asked to 
respond “yes” or “no” to the following statements: “Team members are able to appoint their own team leaders.” 
“Teams are given responsibility for specific products or services.”  “Teamworking depends on team members 
working together.”  Not surprisingly, if any of these alternatives are used to define team autonomy, the point 
estimates of the treatment effects of interest differ from those reported here.  Throughout the paper, I use the general 
terminology “autonomy”, though it is important to remember that the empirical measure is restricted to worker 
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autonomy for deciding about how they do the work, and, thus, all empirical results I report are specific to this 
particular dimension of team autonomy.     
15
 While the argument that teams offer a more flexible organizational structure appears reasonable for autonomous 
teams, it can also be made for non-autonomous teams.  Team production (even non-autonomous team production) 
by its very nature frequently leads to workers having more knowledge of others’ tasks than they would in the case of 
individual production.  This allows team members to reallocate efforts more quickly from one task to another, or 
from one product line to another in response to sudden fluctuations in product demand, than would be possible in the 
case of individual production.  This can happen even if the teams are closely managed (because even if closely 
managed the workers are still working together).   
 
16
 For example, in ordered probits of labor productivity and product quality the coefficients on “just-in-time” are 
statistically insignificant.  For labor productivity, the just-in-time coefficient is -0.047 (Z = 0.40), and for product 
quality it is 0.152 (Z = 1.27).  If industry controls are included in these ordered probits, the just-in-time coefficient is 
0.026 (Z = 0.20) in the labor productivity model and 0.195 (Z = 1.52) in the product quality model. 
17
 Though I treat percentage of employees working from home as a proxy for the importance of monitoring, it might 
also indicate some of the physical requirements of production or service delivery, since clearly some tasks are not 
easily transferred to the home. 
18
 Among other places, this is argued in Baron and Kreps (1999). Following a measured endorsement of granting 
autonomy to teams, they append the following footnote describing the necessary preconditions for the granting of 
autonomy to be beneficial.  “Of course, this takes as given that team members have internalized the organization’s 
goals and possess the information and resources (including training) necessary to manage themselves effectively.  If 
these conditions are not satisfied, then the management involved has been derelict in establishing the preconditions 
for a [self-managed or autonomous] team to work effectively.”  Baron and Kreps (1999) 
19
 A potential concern is that some of these variables might have a direct effect on either teams or labor productivity 
(product quality), though the only one of these variables that is statistically significant in any of these equations is 
whether the employees are fully committed to the values of the organization, which has a positive effect on labor 
productivity (product quality).  Identification does not hinge on this particular variable, however, and its inclusion in 
the performance equations (and the teams equation) yields results similar to those I report in the paper.  
Furthermore, a potential concern is that employer perceptions of incentive alignment and employee commitment 
might be functions of team autonomy rather than determinants of autonomy.  However, if the models are re-
estimated using only “percent working at home” and the statement that “those at the top are best placed to make 
decisions about this workplace” as exclusions, the results are roughly similar to those reported here.     
 
20
 An established theoretical literature (e.g. Huselid and Becker 1996) and a WERS empirical literature (e.g. 
McNabb and Whitfield 1997) suggest the potential importance of interactions between team effects and financial 
incentives for team members.  To explore this, I constructed a new dummy variable equaling one if performance-
related pay is used in the establishment and workers in the largest occupational group at the establishment receive it 
and some non-managerial occupations are eligible for it and it is based on an output measure based on “group or 
team performance”, and zero otherwise.  So the variable captures team-based performance pay in the largest 
occupational group.  Interacting this with the teams treatment (and the autonomy treatment) in ordered probits of 
labor productivity and product quality yields no statistically significant interaction effects.   
21
 Note that the only covariates in the model that are “continuous”, in the usual sense, are establishment size and the 
fraction of employees who work part time.  However, the model also includes several variables recorded in the 
survey as ordered discrete categories.  These include information, incentive alignment, and decisions (5 categories 
each) and work at home (6 categories).  To economize on the number of parameters to be estimated, I treat each of 
these variables as continuous indexes rather than creating multiple dummies for each category.  In unreported 
sensitivity checks I found the same qualitative results in models that include these variables as multiple dummies 
rather than as continuous indexes.   
22
 More precisely, the effects for labor productivity are as follows: 
 
What is the effect of autonomous, or self-managing, teams on labor productivity? 
Effect B1 = Prob(LABPROD=1 | TEAMS=1, AUTO=1) – Prob(LABPROD = 1 | TEAMS = 0) 
Effect B2 = Prob(LABPROD=2 | TEAMS=1, AUTO=1) – Prob(LABPROD = 2 | TEAMS = 0) 
Effect B3 = Prob(LABPROD=3 | TEAMS=1, AUTO=1) – Prob(LABPROD = 3 | TEAMS = 0) 
 
What is the effect of non-autonomous teams on labor productivity? 
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Effect C1 = Prob(LABPROD=1 | TEAMS=1, AUTO=0) – Prob(LABPROD = 1 | TEAMS = 0) 
Effect C2 = Prob(LABPROD=2 | TEAMS=1, AUTO=0) – Prob(LABPROD = 2 | TEAMS = 0) 
Effect C3 = Prob(LABPROD=3 | TEAMS=1, AUTO=0) – Prob(LABPROD = 3 | TEAMS = 0) 
 
What is the incremental effect on labor productivity of autonomy, given that teams are used? 
(Effect D1)i = (Effect B1)i – (Effect C1)i     
(Effect D2)i = (Effect B2)i – (Effect C2)i     
(Effect D3)i = (Effect B3)i – (Effect C3)i     
 
The effects for product quality are analogous.  For further details, see Appendix B and DeVaro (2006). 
 
23
 When interpreting the results of this section one should bear in mind the possibility of biases resulting from 
reporting errors in the subjective measures of labor productivity and product quality.   
 
24
 See Appendix B for a statement of all equations in the model. 
25
 For a recent discussion of this problem and its prevalence in the management literature see Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003). 
26
 Likelihood ratio tests reject the restrictions ∑ = I at the five percent level in the labor productivity model (p = 
0.025) and at the one percent level in the product quality model (p < 0.001).   
27
 As a check, I estimated the model including industry controls in the equations for labor productivity and product 
quality and found that they were statistically insignificant. 
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Table 2:  Exogenous Variables Included in Structural Model 
 
LABPRODi 
and 
QUALITYi 
TEAMSi AUTOi 
 X1 X2 X3 
Establishment Size YES YES YES 
Single-Establishment Firm YES YES YES 
Fraction of Part-Time Workers YES YES YES 
Temporary Workers YES YES YES 
Fixed-Term Workers Under 1 Year YES YES YES 
Fixed-Term Workers Over 1 Year  YES YES YES 
Union Workers YES YES YES 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise YES YES YES 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise YES YES YES 
Private Sector Franchise YES YES YES 
Private Sector Non-franchise YES YES YES 
Public Sector YES YES YES 
Just-In-Time Production 
 
YES  
Information 
  
YES 
Incentive Alignment 
  
YES 
Decisions 
  
YES 
Work at Home 
  
YES 
Industry controls (12) 
 
YES YES 
Occupation controls (10) 
 
YES YES 
                                
Establishment Size: total number of full time, part time, and temporary workers at the 
establishment   
 
Single-Establishment Firm: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is either a single 
independent establishment not belonging to another body, or the sole UK establishment of a 
foreign organization and equals 0 if the establishment is one of a number of different 
establishments within a larger organization 
 
Fraction of Part-Time Workers: number of temporary workers at the establishment as a fraction 
of establishment size 
 
Temporary Workers: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are temporary agency employees 
working at the establishment at the time of the survey and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Fixed-Term Workers Under 1 Year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are employees who are 
working on a temporary basis or have fixed-term contracts for less than one year and equals 0 
otherwise 
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Fixed-Term Workers Over 1 Year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are employees who 
have fixed-term contracts for one year or more and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Union Workers: dummy variables that equals 1 if any of the workers at the establishment belong 
to a union and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a 
private sector publicly-traded company and a franchise and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment 
is a private sector publicly-traded company but not a franchise and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a private sector 
(non-publicly-traded) firm and a franchise and equals 0 otherwise  
 
Private Sector Non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a private 
sector (non-publicly-traded) firm but not a franchise and equals 0 otherwise  
 
Public Sector: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is in the public sector and 
equals 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimates from Structural Model for Labor Productivity 
 LABPROD* 
(TEAMS=1) 
LABPROD* 
(TEAMS=0) 
TEAMS
* 
AUTO* 
0.816** AUTO (0.173) ● ● ● 
0.023 -0.089 -0.138 -0.184* Single-Establishment Firm (0.082) (0.189) (0.105) (0.105) 
-0.002 -0.068 0.052** -0.004 Establishment Size (0.004) (0.057) (0.022) (0.004) 
0.203* 0.133 -0.263 0.066 Fraction of Part-Time Workers (0.114) (0.307) (0.250) (0.183) 
-0.035 -0.133 0.146 -0.261** Temporary Workers 
(0.067) (0.241) (0.108) (0.080) 
0.017 -0.059 0.227** -0.043 Fixed-Term Workers Under 1 Year (0.070) (0.213) (0.106) (0.076) 
0.067 -0.481 0.259* 0.008 Fixed-Term Workers Over 1 Year (0.083) (0.301) (0.150) (0.098) 
-0.017 0.313 0.145 -0.025 Union Workers (0.078) (0.215) (0.115) (0.104) 
0.611** 0.245 0.521 -0.411 Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise (0.245) (2.010) (1.124) (0.321) 
0.229** 0.444 -0.045 -0.032 Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-
franchise (0.077) (0.300) (0.173) (0.118) 
-0.369 0.174 -0.105 -0.131 Private Sector Franchise (0.334) (1.375) (0.349) (0.371) 
0.018 0.670** -0.162 0.155 Private Sector Non-franchise (0.091) (0.322) (0.190) (0.122) 
0.312** Just-in-time ● ● (0.119) ● 
0.102** Information ● ● ● (0.030)  
-
0.193** Incentive alignment ● ● ● 
(0.047) 
0.071** Decisions ● ● ● (0.033) 
-0.063* Work at home ● ● ● (0.038) 
-0.627** -0.893 0.968** 0.686** Constant (0.169) (0.561) (0.277) (0.320) 
1.145 
c (0.065) 
-0.200 
σ
 02 (0.157) 
0.381 
σ 12 (1.283) 
-0.527** 
σ 13 (0.012) 
σ 23 -0.692** 
 40 
 (0.009) 
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses (100 bootstrap replications).  * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. Industry controls and indicators for the largest occupational group are also included in the TEAMS* and AUTO* 
equations.  Sample size is 1727.  
Table 4: Estimates from Structural Model for Quality of Product or Service 
 QUALITY* 
(TEAMS=1) 
QUALITY* 
(TEAMS=0) 
TEAMS
* 
AUTO* 
1.141** AUTO (0.138) ● ● ● 
0.176** 0.242 -0.159 -0.152 Single-Establishment Firm (0.076) (0.151) (0.111) (0.100) 
0.001 -0.091** 0.049** -0.005 Establishment Size (0.004) (0.044) (0.023) (0.005) 
0.006 0.221 -0.194 0.038 Fraction of Part-Time Workers (0.108) (0.196) (0.211) (0.163) 
0.028 -0.318* 0.090 -0.184** Temporary Workers 
(0.070) (0.174) (0.102) (0.072) 
-0.075 -0.046 0.210** -0.037 Fixed-Term Workers Under 1 Year (0.060) (0.157) (0.101) (0.078) 
-0.045 -0.184 0.250** 0.079 Fixed-Term Workers Over 1 Year (0.074) (0.210) (0.120) (0.085) 
-0.135* -0.052 0.185** 0.035 Union Workers (0.073) (0.144) (0.091) (0.091) 
0.470* 0.020 0.609 -0.398 Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise (0.252) (1.396) (1.455) (0.330) 
0.408** 0.542** -0.025 -0.008 Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-
franchise (0.086) (0.249) (0.158) (0.101) 
0.198 -0.037 -0.036 -0.199 Private Sector Franchise (0.298) (0.834) (0.346) (0.382) 
0.375** 0.576** -0.135 0.073 Private Sector Non-franchise (0.095) (0.235) (0.155) (0.121) 
0.316** Just-in-time ● ● (0.096) ● 
0.078** Information ● ● ● (0.029)  
-
0.211** Incentive alignment ● ● ● 
(0.047) 
0.064** Decisions ● ● ● (0.030) 
-
0.075** Work at home ● ● ● 
(0.035) 
-0.329* -0.855** 0.944** 0.813** Constant (0.180) (0.294) (0.264) (0.347) 
1.201 
c (0.084) 
-0.653** 
σ
 02 (0.006) 
0.096 
σ 12 (0.491) 
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-0.697** 
σ 13 (0.003) 
-0.464** 
σ 23 (0.046) 
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses and are based on 100 bootstrap replications.  * and ** indicate significance 
at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.  Industry controls and indicators for the establishment’s largest occupational group are also included in 
the TEAMS* and AUTO* equations.  Sample size is 1917. 
Table 5 
Effect of Team Production on Labor Productivity of Selected Workplaces 
AUTO = Team Members Jointly Decide How the Work is to be Done 
 
 
Panel 1:  Results for Workplace at 0.25 Quantile of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.016 
(0.059) 
-0.042 
(0.061) 
-0.002 
(0.064) 
-0.040 
(0.039) 
Better than 
average 
0.029 
(0.047) 
0.050 
(0.048) 
0.018 
(0.049) 
0.032 
(0.025) 
A lot better than 
average 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.035) 
-0.016 
(0.036) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
 
 
Panel 2:  Results for Workplace at Median of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.110** 
(0.051) 
-0.112* 
(0.057) 
-0.107** 
(0.054) 
-0.005 
(0.044) 
Better than 
average 
0.080** 
(0.039) 
0.081** 
(0.041) 
0.079** 
(0.040) 
0.002 
(0.024) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.030 
(0.021) 
0.031 
(0.025) 
0.028 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
 
 
Panel 3:  Results for Workplace at 0.75 Quantile of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.210** 
(0.056) 
-0.246** 
(0.060) 
-0.193** 
(0.061) 
-0.053 
(0.050) 
Better than 
average 
0.124** 
(0.059) 
0.142** 
(0.063) 
0.114** 
(0.057) 
0.028 
(0.030) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.087** 
(0.026) 
0.103** 
(0.028) 
0.079** 
(0.034) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
 
Notes:  Cell entries denote the effects of team production on the probability that labor productivity is a lot better 
than average for the industry, better than average for the industry, and at or below the industry average.  Standard 
errors from the parametric bootstrap (100 replications) are in parentheses.  * and ** denote statistical significance at 
the 10% and 5% levels, respectively 
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Table 6 
Effect of Team Production on Product Quality of Selected Workplaces 
AUTO = Team Members Jointly Decide How the Work is to be Done 
 
 
Panel 1:  Results for Workplace at 0.25 Quantile of (Effect A3Q – Effect A1Q) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below 0.033 
(0.044) 
0.033 
(0.047) 
0.031 
(0.049) 
0.002 
(0.043) 
Better than 
average 
-0.028 
(0.059) 
-0.033 
(0.059) 
-0.018 
(0.064) 
-0.016 
(0.039) 
A lot better than 
average 
-0.005 
(0.043) 
-0.0002 
(0.043) 
-0.014 
(0.052) 
0.014 
(0.035) 
 
 
Panel 2:  Results for Workplace at Median of (Effect A3Q – Effect A1Q) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.037 
(0.042) 
-0.038 
(0.048) 
-0.035 
(0.042) 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
Better than 
average 
-0.023 
(0.063) 
-0.030 
(0.069) 
-0.012 
(0.059) 
-0.018 
(0.036) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.060 
(0.037) 
0.069* 
(0.040) 
0.047 
(0.041) 
0.022 
(0.028) 
 
 
Panel 3:  Results for Workplace at 0.75 Quantile of (Effect A3Q – Effect A1Q) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.132** 
(0.057) 
-0.141** 
(0.061) 
-0.123** 
(0.063) 
-0.019 
(0.052) 
Better than 
average 
0.018 
(0.087) 
0.020 
(0.094) 
0.015 
(0.084) 
0.006 
(0.043) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.114** 
(0.049) 
0.121** 
(0.054) 
0.108* 
(0.061) 
0.013 
(0.035) 
 
Notes:  Cell entries denote the effects of team production on the probability that product quality is a lot better than 
average for the industry, better than average for the industry, and at or below the industry average.  Standard errors 
from the parametric bootstrap (100 replications) are in parentheses.  * and ** denote statistical significance at the 
10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
“Non-Structural” Effect of Team Production on Labor Productivity of Selected Workplaces 
AUTO = Team Members Jointly Decide How the Work is to be Done 
 
 
Panel 1:  Results for Workplace at 0.25 Quantile of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.027 
(0.045) 
-0.046 
(0.045) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
-0.032 
(0.023) 
Better than 
average 
0.015 
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.034) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.012 
(0.027) 
0.021 
(0.027) 
0.006 
(0.028) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
 
 
Panel 2:  Results for Workplace at Median of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.125** 
(0.047) 
-0.137** 
(0.046) 
-0.105** 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.023) 
Better than 
average 
0.086** 
(0.033) 
0.094** 
(0.034) 
0.074** 
(0.034) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.043** 
(0.020) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
 
 
Panel 3:  Results for Workplace at 0.75 Quantile of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.214** 
(0.071) 
-0.221** 
(0.072) 
-0.189** 
(0.072) 
-0.032 
(0.023) 
Better than 
average 
0.126* 
(0.065) 
0.129** 
(0.066) 
0.115* 
(0.065) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.088** 
(0.024) 
0.092** 
(0.026) 
0.074** 
(0.023) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
 
Notes: Cell entries denote the effects of team production on the probability that labor productivity is a lot better than 
average for the industry, better than average for the industry, and at or below the industry average.  Standard errors 
from the parametric bootstrap (100 replications) are in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 
10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
“Non-Structural” Effect of Team Production on Product Quality of Selected Workplaces 
AUTO = Team Members Jointly Decide How the Work is to be Done 
 
 
Panel 1:  Results for Workplace at 0.25 Quantile of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.045 
(0.033) 
-0.062* 
(0.035) 
-0.022 
(0.034) 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
Better than 
average 
0.024 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.021) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.021 
(0.029) 
0.029 
(0.031) 
0.010 
(0.029) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
 
 
Panel 2:  Results for Workplace at Median of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.068* 
(0.041) 
-0.084* 
(0.043) 
-0.059 
(0.040) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
Better than 
average 
-0.014 
(0.036) 
-0.022 
(0.037) 
-0.010 
(0.033) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.082** 
(0.031) 
0.106** 
(0.034) 
0.070** 
(0.031) 
0.037* 
(0.020) 
 
 
Panel 3:  Results for Workplace at 0.75 Quantile of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
 All Teams Autonomous Teams 
Non-Autonomous 
Teams Difference 
Average or below -0.196** 
(0.064) 
-0.213** 
(0.068) 
-0.175** 
(0.061) 
-0.039* 
(0.022) 
Better than 
average 
0.116* 
(0.060) 
0.123* 
(0.063) 
0.107* 
(0.055) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
A lot better than 
average 
0.080** 
(0.034) 
0.090** 
(0.038) 
0.068** 
(0.034) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
 
Notes:  Cell entries denote the effects of team production on the probability that product quality is a lot better than 
average for the industry, better than average for the industry, and at or below the industry average.  Standard errors 
from the parametric bootstrap (100 replications) are in parentheses.  * and ** denote statistical significance at the 
10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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          Figure 1:  Effect of Teams on Labor Productivity and Product Quality 
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Panel 3: 'Non-structural' Effect of Teams on Labor Product ivity
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Notes:  Workplaces with the highest predicted benefits from teams are those farthest from the origin 
in the second quadrant, whereas those with the lowest predicted benefits are those farthest from the  
origin in the fourth quadrant.  Panels 1 and 2 compute the effects of interest from the unconstrained  
structural model, whereas Panels 3 and 4 compute the effects using the estimates from the models that 
impose ∑ = I in estimation.  Sample sizes are N = 1727 in the labor productivity model and N = 1917 
in the product quality model.  The axes are defined as follows:    
(Effect A1)i = Prob(LABPRODi = 1 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(LABPRODi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A2)i = Prob(LABPRODi = 2 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(LABPRODi = 2 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A3)i = Prob(LABPRODi = 3 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(LABPRODi = 3 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A1Q)i = Prob(QUALITYi = 1 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(QUALITYi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A2Q)i = Prob(QUALITYi = 2 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(QUALITYi = 2 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A3Q)i = Prob(QUALITYi = 3 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(QUALITYi = 3 | TEAMSi = 0) 
 
